cejel
/ "SEH-jel" /A trust certificate for your codebase.
Everything Cejel does asks the same question: is this claim backed by evidence that survives someone else checking it? Code that claims to be tested. An AI that claims its output is correct. A backtest that claims a return. Same question in three domains. The deterministic offline core ships today; the domain packs are in development, and nothing is published as validated until it passes calibration on repositories it has never seen.
No install, no signup, fully offline.
Also: pnpm dlx @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 . · bunx @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 .
Current · v0.4.4 npm, Docker / OCI, the Official MCP Registry, and the GitHub Action now point to the current release. Verify the source record →
See Cejel produce the evidence
Product demo · 93 secondsWatch a real offline scan turn one pinned repository revision into inspectable evidence, explicit limitations, and a reproducible decision package.
What it proves: Cejel binds supported evidence to named repository, tool, and rubric revisions. The unsigned public attestation is not independent assurance or a claim that the software is safe.
Rubric v17 passed a preregistered, untouched holdout.
Cejel free-core rubric v17 was scored on a frozen, untouched 200-repository open-source calibration it never trained on. We committed to publishing the result either way, before we saw it.
Every criterion and abstention gate passed. Scope: public repositories on the v17 free-core rule set — this measures whether a codebase's claims are backed by inspectable evidence, not vulnerability detection. Separate calibrations (e.g. the Quant pack) carry their own claims.
Why v17 is still the public default.
Prospective v19 changes only B4's numeric freshness reference from scan wall clock to
the scanned commit's year. Its preregistered paired rescore completed all 24 rows with
zero score, status, coverage, placement, or non-B4 changes. That GO published the delta;
it did not authorize replacing holdout-calibrated v17. The leaderboard was regenerated
on 2026-08-19 by executing published @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 with no rubric pin,
so it now runs the calibrated v17 default; prospective rubrics remain explicit-only.
Available wherever you work
Cejel is published across the command line, CI, containers, and MCP discovery surfaces. Each card names the exact version or installation route it serves.
Distribution note
v0.4.4 is current on npm, Docker / OCI, the Official MCP Registry, GitHub Releases,
standalone binaries, Homebrew, and the GitHub Action v1 source route below.
Every row was read or executed live at the timestamp shown; no prior release result was
copied forward.
What each route serves today
This table records a live check on 2026-08-20. It distinguishes an attested artifact from a reference to one. Consumer tools are pinned in the linked workflow: Node 24.15.0, npm/npx 11.17.0, pnpm 11.21.0, Bun 1.3.14, GitHub CLI 2.97.0, Git 2.50.1, and Docker Buildx 0.34.1.
| Surface or route | Version served today | Carries provenance? | Command that proved it | Route check |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm package | 0.4.4 | Yes — npm metadata names 21ae64ca80dce8ca6dd9ec6c0687204fc8578599… and advertises SLSA provenance | npx --yes npm@11.17.0 view @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 version gitHead dist.attestations --json | npm record · checked 2026-08-20 |
| npx, pinned | 0.4.4 | Yes — the npm package attestation | npx --yes @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 --version | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20 |
| npx, latest | 0.4.4 | Yes — the npm package attestation | npx --yes @cejel/cejel@latest --version | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20 |
| npx, unpinned | 0.4.4 | Yes — the resolved npm package attestation | npx --yes @cejel/cejel --version | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20; pin 0.4.4 for reproducibility |
| pnpm dlx, pinned | 0.4.4 | Yes — the npm package attestation | npx --yes pnpm@11.21.0 dlx @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 --version | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20 |
| pnpm dlx, unpinned | 0.4.4 from a fresh resolution | Yes — the resolved npm package attestation | npx --yes pnpm@11.21.0 dlx @cejel/cejel --version | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20; release-age lag expired |
| bunx, pinned | 0.4.4 | Yes — the resolved npm package attestation | Bun 1.3.14: bunx @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 --version | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20 |
| Docker / OCI | 0.4.4 | Yes — GitHub-hosted attestation names 21ae64ca80dce8ca6dd9ec6c0687204fc8578599… | Docker Buildx 0.34.1: docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/barglabs/cejel:0.4.4 | release-chain readback · checked 2026-08-20 · sha256:2e443b621f884e351c88aee926f1be9357bdee707e66fa54e9e442cf0cd44211 |
| Official MCP Registry | 0.4.4 via immutable OCI digest | Yes — it names ghcr.io/barglabs/cejel@sha256:2e443b621f884e351c88aee926f1be9357bdee707e66fa54e9e442cf0cd44211 | curl -sS 'https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0.1/servers/io.github.BargLabs%2Fcejel/versions/latest' | live registry record · checked 2026-08-20 · isLatest: true |
| GitHub Releases | v0.4.4 published | Yes — release includes the Sigstore provenance bundle | GitHub CLI 2.97.0: gh release view v0.4.4 --repo BargLabs/cejel --json isDraft,publishedAt,assets | release record · checked 2026-08-20 · published 2026-08-18T21:46:52Z · 12 assets |
Standalone binaries + SHA256SUMS | 0.4.4 · five targets | Yes — release carries per-asset SBOMs, checksums, and signed provenance over the checksum set | gh release download v0.4.4 --repo BargLabs/cejel --pattern SHA256SUMS | published checksums · checked 2026-08-20 |
| Windows standalone binary | 0.4.4 · x86_64 | Release carries cejel-v0.4.4-provenance.sigstore.json plus SHA256SUMS; the guarded build verifies the executable is intentionally not code-signed | GitHub CLI 2.97.0: gh release download v0.4.4 --repo BargLabs/cejel --pattern cejel-Windows-x86_64.exe --pattern SHA256SUMS | fresh native Windows stranger-check · checked 2026-08-20 · exit 0 · binary SHA-256 06574c4cb04a8c8fda8379cff687d8db9c4c27fe755c584beafe7f4e16edd464 · report parity 15ed49255d68661e4e7b7c30cec45da44548a8789bb236547e3c93df5f4f00fd |
| Homebrew | 0.4.4 | Checksums in the live tap formula match the GitHub Release digests | GitHub CLI 2.97.0: gh api 'repos/BargLabs/homebrew-tap/contents/Formula/cejel.rb?ref=main' | tap PR #18 · checked 2026-08-20 · post-merge brew test-bot passed |
GitHub Action root @v0.4.4 | 0.4.4 consumer runtime | Immutable source-tag route; not an artifact-provenance surface | uses: BargLabs/cejel@v0.4.4 | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20 |
GitHub Action root @main | 0.4.4 consumer runtime | Floating source route; not an artifact-provenance surface | uses: BargLabs/cejel@main | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20 |
GitHub Action action@v1 | 0.4.4 consumer runtime | Floating compatible-v1 source route; not an artifact-provenance surface | uses: BargLabs/cejel/action@v1 | consumer run · checked 2026-08-20 |
| Smithery | Directory record; no separate Cejel artifact | No — anonymous discovery references the published server; connecting requires an account | npx --yes @smithery/cli@latest mcp search cejel --json | anonymous stranger-check · checked 2026-08-20 · listed; unauthenticated add stopped at the login boundary |
| OpenClaw MCP | 0.4.4 through the npm package | Yes — the resolved npm package attestation | npx --yes openclaw@latest mcp add cejel --command npx --arg -y --arg --package=@cejel/cejel@latest --arg cejel-mcp | Node 22 + 24 stranger-check · checked 2026-08-20 · add and probe passed |
Pinned and unpinned package-client routes were executed independently. The three Action rows read the runtime version from each produced attestation; they do not claim artifact provenance for source references. Smithery's anonymous boundary is recorded as a boundary, not upgraded to a successful authenticated install.
npx @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 .
Standalone binariesmacOS, Linux, and Windows · five native targets
SHA256SUMS + provenance
Docker / OCIPublic, non-root, multi-platform image
ghcr.io/barglabs/cejel:0.4.4
GitHub ActionSource tag · v0.4.4
BargLabs/cejel/action@v1
HomebrewNative install from the Barg Labs tap · v0.4.4
brew install barglabs/tap/cejel
SmitheryDiscovery is free; connecting requires a Smithery account
npx -y @smithery/cli@latest mcp add cejel
Official MCP RegistryActive digest-pinned server record · v0.4.4
io.github.BargLabs/cejel
OpenClawVerified working · pin openclaw@latest
npx -y openclaw@latest mcp add cejel …
Read the source record before relying on a release.
For the v0.4.4 npm and OCI release, Cejel’s report.json and
summary.json are byte-identical across runs on the same commit. The published
provenance records name commit 21ae64ca80dce8ca6dd9ec6c0687204fc8578599.
Provenance is available on npm and the OCI image. The MCP Registry accepts an OCI digest reference, which provides provenance by reference; Cejel’s current record names the immutable v0.4.4 image digest.
Read the current MCP Registry record:
curl -sS 'https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0.1/servers/io.github.BargLabs%2Fcejel/versions/latest'Check the Registry’s accepted OCI digest-reference form:
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/main/internal/validators/registries/oci.go |
rg 'registry/namespace/image@sha256:digest'npm · @cejel/cejel@0.4.4
Read the package metadata, then fetch npm’s published attestation record:
npm view @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 --json
curl -s "https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/attestations/@cejel%2fcejel@0.4.4"The metadata’s gitHead and the provenance record’s resolved source both name
21ae64ca80dce8ca6dd9ec6c0687204fc8578599.
Docker / OCI · ghcr.io/barglabs/cejel:0.4.4
Fetch the GitHub-hosted provenance bundle for the image digest and read the source it names:
gh api 'repos/BargLabs/cejel/attestations/sha256:2e443b621f884e351c88aee926f1be9357bdee707e66fa54e9e442cf0cd44211' --jq '.attestations[].bundle.dsseEnvelope.payload' |
tr -d '\n' | base64 -D | jq '{source: .predicate.buildDefinition.resolvedDependencies}'The returned source record names the v0.4.4 tag and commit
21ae64ca80dce8ca6dd9ec6c0687204fc8578599.
Your scanners find issues. Cejel decides what they mean.
Cejel runs its own deterministic, offline repository checks and issues an evidence-bound certificate. It can also fold in findings you already have — SARIF reports (Semgrep, CodeQL, Snyk, Trivy, or Codex Security), OpenSSF Scorecard, or any internal tool mapped to Cejel's documented JSON signal contract — into that one verifiable result. The scanners find; Cejel certifies, and abstains when the evidence does not support a verdict.
npx @cejel/cejel@0.4.4 . --ingest results.sarif --ingest scorecard.json
Offline, deterministic, inspectable. No model call, no source upload. View the generic JSON contract →
Changelog
v0.4.4 · August 18, 2026
Certificate text stays inside its tooltip. Long unbroken metric descriptions now wrap inside the HTML certificate tooltip instead of overflowing its fixed-width box.
A named rubric must actually run. The sealed scoring path now rejects an explicitly supplied rubric version that is not wired into public dispatch, rather than issuing a certificate that names a rubric which did not execute. The release also adds clean-runner checks for the Smithery and OpenClaw MCP routes.
Rubric versions
Every certificate names the rubric version that produced it — so you can see exactly what you got. Certificates stay valid under the rubric that issued them; a recalibration does not invalidate an older one.
| Rubric | Status | What changed |
|---|---|---|
v17 | Current default | Archetype-aware calibration; abstains instead of scoring absent evidence. Passed a preregistered, untouched 200-repository holdout (96.43% precision / 95.64% rubric-agreement recall / 0.66% false-positive rate). This is not detection recall; no detection-recall figure is published. |
v9 | Prior default | Process/CI-weighted scoring with calibrated pinned-dependency guidance. Tended to read clean libraries low when a checkout lacked CI or history — the bias v17 corrects. |
Verified standalone binaries
Version 0.4.4 is published on the canonical GitHub Release. Each public binary was executed against the source build and run with networking denied before publication, and the Windows and Linux arm64 assets were separately re-verified as downloaded — the same way a stranger downloads them — on a real Windows runner and a real (non-emulated) Linux aarch64 runner.
The Windows executable is not code-signed. Windows SmartScreen will show an "unrecognized publisher" warning the first time you run it — that warning is expected, not a sign of tampering. What you can check instead of a publisher signature: the SHA-256 checksum and the signed Sigstore provenance attestation below, which show the file is byte-for-byte what this release published and how it was built. Neither is code signing, and neither is a claim that Microsoft, Apple, or any other authority has signed or vetted this binary.
Download SHA256SUMS · Download signed provenance · View the successful guarded build
asset="cejel-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)" curl -fsSLO "https://github.com/BargLabs/cejel/releases/download/v0.4.4/$asset" curl -fsSLO https://github.com/BargLabs/cejel/releases/download/v0.4.4/SHA256SUMS if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null; then grep " $asset$" SHA256SUMS | sha256sum -c - else grep " $asset$" SHA256SUMS | shasum -a 256 -c - fi chmod +x "$asset" && "./$asset" .
Published SHA-256 digests
26fb7a3bd10a959020b52369966d558616b8a741c6e9cbf8b943bc3f138f4826 cejel-Darwin-arm64 08469257e2dee3be9f06d3e001d9516170fbe3c54a7c0019c6b9828015f924ab cejel-Darwin-x86_64 c430373da5379f98190873cf56a2ca3debd3c11e7736eed133f736f51839f93e cejel-Linux-aarch64 1960bdfbd51dfd768055d2f8822b063e1ac8e20ca10c38b17a0733bdc877316e cejel-Linux-x86_64 06574c4cb04a8c8fda8379cff687d8db9c4c27fe755c584beafe7f4e16edd464 cejel-Windows-x86_64.exe
Don't take "offline" on trust — turn your network off and run it anyway.
It will still score your repo and write you a certificate.
The leaderboard
Scores restored — 2026-08-19.
The republication condition was met. Every row now published was regenerated by executing
@cejel/cejel@0.4.4 end to end through npx, with default settings,
calibrated rubric v17, no rubric pin, and no internal engine in the path. The board retains
the complete 2026-08-18 withdrawal record and marks it resolved.
The board publishes the package spec, pinned repository commits, and exact reproduction recipe beside the restored results.